Since the seminal work of Oates (1972) on scal federalism, a central question of public nance has been which level of a federation should be assigned the provision of public goods. In this paper we study the problem of a government that is to choose the optimal centralization/decentralization mechanism for the nal treatment of municipal solid waste. We analyze incentives, equilibria and implications of the governance framework for the disposal of waste. The key decisions revolve around the mobility of waste and the externalities (pollution) associated with its disposal, be it incineration or landll. Moreover, if the Regions are characterized by dierent levels of eciency in the processes they apply to the nal treatment of waste, in theory a certain degree of waste mobility across regions should allow to reap the benets of higher eciency. On the other hand, as transportation and other environmental costs implied by mobility and concentration are signicant, a trade-o emerges. Our model evaluates the implications of that trade-o for the optimal degree of decentralization in waste management.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Oates (1972) on scal federalism, a central question of public nance has been which level of a federation should be assigned the provision of public goods. Local jurisdictions are likely to account for local conditions but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers while Central governments may internalize those spillovers but are likely to ignore local conditions. Both factors appear to be empirically relevant in environmental applications where 1 Waste generation and waste disposal are certainly quite important in this debate. For waste generation there is no evidence of decoupling while environmental costs associated with waste disposal are increasing.The European Environmental Agency (EEA) acknowledges that waste volumes in the European Union (EU) are growing (EEA (2009)), driven by changing production and consumption patterns (Andersen et al. (2007) ), and it highlights the importance of regulation to reduce waste and improve decoupling.
The achievement of some degree of decoupling is of prime importance for waste given that for the EU (EEA (2009)) there is absence of absolute decoupling for waste generation. Mazzanti et al. (2012) Policy eectiveness is very important for achieving waste targets, especially in a system of decentralised waste management that characterize some western countries.
The literature has long studied these problems from an empirical point of view with reference to the existence of a Kuznet curve (Mazzanti et al. (2008 (Mazzanti et al. ( , 2012 ; Mazzanti and Zoboli (2008, 2009) and with reference to the so called NIMB behaviour as concerns the location of hazardous waste disposal sites (Fredriksson (2000) ). The theoretical literature is less developed and uses the standard assumptions of the scal federalism theory to justify the existence of decentralised decision in waste management, but only few attempts have been done to study this problem. In this context, the literature does not seem to agree on the which level is more ecient; for example Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) argue that decentralisation might reach a more ecient allocation than centralisation while other authors seem to think that scal competition and race to the bottom eects may prevail (Oates and Schwab. (1988) ; Oates (1999) ).
The aim of our article is to ll this gap by presenting a model that can answer some important policy questions. This paper in fact studies the problem of a government that is to choose the optimal centralization/decentralization mechanism for the nal treatment of municipal solid waste. We analyze incentives, equilibria and implications of the governance framework for the disposal of waste. The key decisions revolve around the mobility of waste and the externalities (pollution) associated with its disposal, be it incineration or landll.
Moreover, if the Regions are characterized by dierent levels of eciency in the processes they apply to the nal treatment of waste, in theory a certain degree of waste mobility across regions should allow to reap the benets of higher efciency. On the other hand, as transportation and other environmental costs implied by mobility and concentration are signicant, a trade-o emerges. Our model evaluates the implications of that trade-o for the optimal degree of decentralization in waste management.
Our model start from a simple framework where, due to the presence of spillovers, a centralised solution should be preferred from the point of view of maximising total welfare. However, our model shows that the distribution of welfare among the dierent regions may be dierent and a centralised solution is not always preferred by each Region. We show that the presence of spillovers 1 For reviews seeBanzhaf and Chupp (2011); Buchholz et al. (2011) and scal illusion means that a First Best optimal solution cannot be reached.
This means that, although at centralised level the sum of welfare is always maximised, the decision on how to allocate the benecial eects of centralisation among the two Regions may imply that other second best solutions may be preferred by the Regions themselves. The article will be organised as follows:
in section 2 we present the most important model of governance of municipal waste management across Europe; in the following section we present our model while in section 4we discuss our results and the principal policy implications of our analysis. Finally section 5 presents the principal conclusions of our analysis and the way forward in this analysis.
Municipal Waste Management across Europe
Across countries, municipal waste management (MWM) is operated through a variety of decentralization solutions. In the European Union, the governance system typically involves three dierent institutional levels, having sometimes conicting targets:
• national level, framed by the EU, mainly focused on material balance and economic, technical and environmental regulation;
• regional level, focused on planning of disposal capacity, enforcement of the self-suciency principle, authorization of facilities and overview of MWM practices;
• local level, focused on the organization of MWM services, in the frame of general rules concerning management and nance of local services, competition laws, etc.
In Germany, responsibility for waste management is shared between the national government, the federal states and local authorities. The national Ministry of Environment sets priorities, participates in the enactment of laws, oversees strategic planning, information and public relations and denes requirements for waste facilities. Each federal state adopts its own waste management act containing supplementary regulations to the national law, e.g., concerning regional waste management concepts and rules on requirements for disposal. There is no national waste management planning in Germany. Instead, each Federal State develops a waste management plan for its area.
Since 2007, in France a new waste management policy and strategy have been developed with a detailed stakeholder engagement process, known as thè Grenelle Environnement' process. A new legislative framework has been set with specic targets for waste management at the national level, although the implementation of waste prevention plans is xed at the municipality level.
Italy until recently broadly followed the German model, but with subregional authorities (provinces) responsible for planning, regulation of access to facilities and overview of MWM services. Access to landll sites and incinerators was limited to provincial waste. Recently, new national laws introduced the provision of nal treatment sites receiving municipal waste from any region in the country, subject to certain emergency conditions. Moreover, regional laws have fostered mobility of waste across provinces within the same region.
Waste policy is a devolved matter in the UK. The devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are responsible for strategy and policy relating to waste management in those regions.
The model
Waste is a good whose treatment is harmful to the environment. The Country is divided in two equally-sized Regions, 1 and 2, and it is managed by a Central Government (CG). Each region is endowed with xed income Y and an environmental good (clean air) amounting to z. Income generates an amount of waste equal to q i , which can be disposed of in the same region or it can be exported to the other. We denote by w i the quantity of waste disposed of in region i.
Waste treatment has several costs that depend on the technology used and the policy actions each region undertakes to reduce the related environmental damage. We assume that the cost to treat one unit of waste is region-specic and is equal to p i . Each unit of waste to be treated reduces the quantity available of the environmental good by an amount v. Pollution in turn can be reduced by investing in a technology that lowers emissions by a quantity r i . Therefore, the environmental damage is proportional to the quantity of waste treated and to the investment each region undertakes. Analytically,
where α i measures the productivity of the region-specic investment. The marginal damage is increasing in w i and it is always positive, i.e. w i > α i r i Pollution from waste spills over regions boundaries: waste treatment in region i causes pollution in region j at a rate k. When k = 1, there is full spillover.
In each region, the stock of the environmental good, net of the damage produced by waste disposal activities, can be written as:
For k = 0 there is no spillover: the damage produced by waste disposal activities does not spread to the neighbouring region and those activities can be considered a local public bad. On the other hand, if k = 1, waste disposal becomes a national public bad.
We assume that the cost to dispose one unit of waste is Region specic and is equal to p i Furthermore, the investment to protect the environment has a cost equal to θi 2 r 2 i w i , i.e. the cost is proportional to the waste that should be disposed and is increasing in the level of investment r. Such cost is Region and technology-specic.
We will assume that there is a correlation between the marginal cost to dispose waste, its impact on environment and the technology used to reduce the damage. In particular, we will assume that α and p i are positively correlated which means that technologies that are more ecient in reducing the damage to the environment are also more costly. The unit cost of the investment in green technology θ i is instead assumed to be a productivity parameter, and will be used to capture eciency in waste disposal activities.
The welfare function is a linear combination of disposable income and utility that can be derived by the environmental good. Welfare can be written as:
where m is the price paid for waste mobility. In the centralised model it is set by the Government, in the decentralised model it will be decided through a bargaining between the two Regions.
In this environment we want to study the eects of decentralisation in waste management (i.e. the decision to allow each Region to separately determine its level of waste reducing activities) and the eects of allowing for waste disposal outside the Region in which waste has been produced. In this environment where information is symmetric the centralised solution should always be preferred to a decentralised one. However, while this is true for total welfare, its distribution among the two Region may vary sensibly and it may have important impacts on the environmental quality.
First Best
In the presence of spillovers and no other advantages in terms of productivity dierentials or dierences in local preferences, welfare is maximised by a central planner that jointly maximises the utility of both Regions (Oates (2008); Tresch (2002) . Let us rst assume that the total amount of waste is xed to 2q. The problem for the central planner is to nd the quantity of w to be disposed in each Region, and the transfer price to use.
The problem can be written as:
The maximisation is presented in A and the main results in terms of waste disposal and the investment to reduce its environmental impact can be summarised as follows:
βvα2(1+k) θ2 The investment in activities aimed at reducing the environmental damage depends on the productivity of these activities and on their cost. The higher the eciency of the technology that reduces the negative eects of waste disposal (α) the higher the investment. The productivity has of course the same eect: the lower θ the higher the investment. It is interesting to note that the investment in reducing the damage is correlated to the degree of spillovers: the higher the spillover the higher the investment. The waste ow depends on the combined eects of eciency in damage reducing activities and their cost.
However, this maximisation process does not allow to determine the price at which the waste moved from one Region to the other should be paid. The determination of this price is what might driven a system to choose one solution instead of another one as we will show in the following section.
From an ecient point of view, the price should be set through pseudo market where the demand for waste is matched by its supply. The process is described in appendix Aand the price would be equal to:
but since a market does not exist in this setting, such solution cannot be reached. This opens up the possibility to reaching second best solutions that may imply an inecient environmental protection and a higher cost in terms of waste disposal.
Centralised decision
Let us assume that the waste management decision are taken by Central Government. The problem is to nd the quantity of w to be disposed in each Region and to determine the transfer price if the mobility solution is to be preferred to the no mobility one. The problem that Central Government has to solve is equal to the one presented in the previous section and the results are summarised in table 1.
From a welfare point of view, given that in the unconstrained equilibrium there is a ow between the two Regions, the solution with mobility is preferred to the one without mobility. However, this does not necessarily mean that both
Regions are better o with this solution because the transfer price determines
The price that makes the more ecient Region indierent between waste disposal exchange and a solution where each Region dispose its waste is higher than the marginal cost of disposal p 1 . The economic intuition behind this result is quite clear. Importing waste produces increases in waste management, in the damage reducing activity and it increases the consumption of the local environmental good. The only benet is produced by a reduction in the spillovers.
Even though the productivity gap is quite big and the spillovers are important, such reduction cannot compensate for the higher costs unless the transfer price is higher than the marginal cost of disposal. It interesting to note that in this case the Region that lose is the one that is more productive. In our model the productivity parameters are xed, but in the long run this may not be the case.
A transfer price equal to the marginal cost may lead to a race to the bottom eect, as suggested by the traditional literature (Oates and Schwab. (1988) ). This is something that should be kept in mind by the regulator in setting the transfer price.
Decentralised decision
Let us now assume that each Region sets its own level of investment and waste disposal according to its preferences and resources. In doing so, it maximises its welfare function that can be written as:
As for centralisation, we can consider two dierent cases: • mobility is not allowed, i.e. w i = q
• mobility is allowed, i.e. w i ≷ q. When mobility is allowed, each Region chooses its preferred level of w and r maximising equation but each Region chooses its preferred w without taking into account that w 1 + w 2 = 2q, as shown in appendix B. This condition must however be satised. To reconcile decentralization with market clearing conditions, it is necessary to nd a value for m d , the transfer price, that satises the optimal choice of each Region and market clearing conditions. The problem can be solved using a Nash game:
and the results are presented in 2 The investment in the r is suboptimal as in the previous case and the quantity of waste that is exchanged is lower than in centralisation. From a welfare point of view, since no mobility (w i = q) is a possible outcome of the bargaining solution, the decentralised solution with mobility is always preferred to the solution without mobility and in fact it represent a Pareto improvement since both Regions are better o.
Discussion
The model presented in the previous sections shows that decentralisation in waste management activities has not an easy solution. From the point of view of total welfare, the choice of a centralised system with waste exchange is preferable, but the transfer price in this case plays a fundamental role. This means that an ecient and equitable system may be dicult to be implemented. The eects of these distortions are even more important if we consider the choice of which level should be responsible for waste management. In this case there does not seem to be a unique solution and much depends on the starting point.
In a centralised system, waste exchange maximises total welfare, but the more ecient Regions may oppose this policy unless the price for disposal across the border is suciently high. It should also be noted that the quantity of waste to be moved across the border should be decided by Central Government in order to mimic the First Best solution. This is because each Region does not take into account the positive and negative spillovers of its decisions. To show this let us consider a system where Central Government sets the investment in damage reducing technology at its optimal level r i = βvαi (1+k) θi while the ow of cross border waste disposal is decided at Regional level. The optimal quantity of waste to be disposed in each Region can be found by maximising 6 with the further assumption that r i =
βvαi(1+k) θi
. A process similar to the one described in 3.3 and presented in C leads to the solution proposed in the rst column of table 3 which is not the equal to FB. In fact, the price is higher and, consequently, the waste ow is suboptimal. The problem here arises because each Region in maximising 6 takes the level of waste disposed in the other Region as xed, i.e. the miss to perceive that if more waste is disposed within their boundaries the spillovers from the other Region will reduce. This produces a welfare loss for both Regions in terms of environment protection. In fact, although the investment in the pollution reducing technology is set at its optimal level, the allocation of waste is not optimal and the Region where waste disposal produces more environmental damage is overproducing. A dierent solution would be for Central Government to set a price that makes Regions choose the optimal ow of waste. However, this solution implies that the price paid by the exporting Region is lower than the price received by the importing one as shown in table...
Let us now examine the the choice between a centralised system where mobility is allowed and a decentralised one. From the point of view of maximising total welfare, the centralised system is the optimal choice, but this does not necessarily means that both Regions are better o in the centralised system. As before let us consider the case where l α1 θ1 > α2 θ2
. In this case the ow of waste is directed towards Region 1, but in decentralisation the ow is reduced. From 1 and 2 we can in fact note that w case two eects works in the same direction: the lower investment in pollution reducing activities means that the marginal cost to import waste is higher than in the centralised model; furthermore having assumed that the Region does not perceive the reduction in pollution arising from a reduction in the level of waste disposed in the other Region, the price for mobility is higher than in FB.
This positive eect on welfare is counterbalanced by the increase in pollution deriving from a reduction in the investment in pollution reducing technology.
As in the previous case, we need to compare the welfare under the two
The algebra becomes quite cumbersome in this case, but in general it can be shown that Region 1 may be better o with decentralisation. This is certainly true if m c = p 1 2 and k = 0. For k = 0 we can write:
The sign of this expression depends on the relative size of the productivity parameters, the price and the attitudes of Regions towards the environment. In general the higher the productivity gap the higher the probability that Region 1 gains from decentralisation. For k = 0 we can write:
This expression is certainly positive since it is the product of a positive quantity w d 1 − q and a positive price dierence.
However, even when Region 1 is better o through decentralisation, the decision to decentralise waste management is not a Pareto improvement from centralisation. In this case in fact the less ecient Region will suer a substantial loss. Environment protection will be lower hence this solution may not be implemented if protecting the environment is a priority.
Other scenarios could be evaluated, namely: 1) the change from a a centralised system where mobility is not allowed to decentralisation without mobility and 2) the change from a centralised system with mobility to a decentralised system without mobility. In both cases total welfare the more ecient Region may be better o in decentralisation, but in this case a higher productivity gap is necessary for Region 1 to prefer decentralisation. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The starting solution in the rst scenario (centralisation without mobility) is preferred by Region 1 to the case presented above (centralisation with mobility). The welfare that can be attained with decentralisation is the same, hence other thing being equal a higher productivity gap is necessary to make Region 1 better o. In the second case, the only gain for Region 1 is represented by the reduction in the loss suered from setting a cross border waste disposal price lower than its actual cost. Our model can be extended in several ways.The rst and more interesting is certainly to consider the quantity of waste q as a variable that partly depends on the income level, but that also depends on the price that the community perceives for waste disposal. This extension could add new elements to our basic framework. In fact, if the community had to pay waste disposal on its full marginal price rather than a tax, in a context where cross border waste disposal is allowed. To determine an ecient price the regulator should determine the price at which demand and supply would clear. To do so, it is necessary to maximise the welfare of each Region separately under the assumption that they take into account that w 1 + w 2 = 2q and that r i = βvα i For the no mobility case, since the FOCS for r 1 and r 2 are independent from w, their optimal level is still represented by the no mobility solution while for w i = q.
B Optimal conditions for the decentralised model
In the decentralised case, when mobility is allowed, each Region maximises its welfare which depends on their own choices and what is chosen by the other Region.
